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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee has erred in its Statement of the Case (Appellee's Brief, p. 3) in 
its declaration that the trial court has never issued a signed order denying the motion to 
withdraw. The Order denying the motion was signed on August 14, 1995, and was 
included as Item No. 7 in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant has some difficult addressing the State of Utah/Appellee's Brief, 
since the State did not refer specifically to the points raised in Appellant's Brief. In fact, 
Appellant wonders again if the State has actually read the Appellant's Brief, since there 
are so many misstatements in the State's Brief. Appellant incorporates his original Brief 
herein by reference, and particularly addresses the points raised by the State, hereafter: 
POINT I 
A READING OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE SENTENCING HEARING 
MAKES IT VERY CLEAR THAT THE JUDGE PRECLUDED ANY 
POSSIBILITY OF ADDRESSING ANY ARGUMENTS RELATIVE TO 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES OR THE TERMS OF THE 
PROSECUTOR'S PLEA BARGAIN 
Appellant has previously pointed out that the guidelines were adhered to 
with regard to Josh St. Clair by Adult Probation and Parole. Appellant's Brief, p. 4. The 
Appellant recognizes that the trial court had discretion to treat the defendants differently, 
as long as there is a reasonable basis for the difference, which difference is to be set forth 
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as a finding. State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). No such finding was made 
concerning the treatment of Josh St. Clair and, indeed, there is no evidence on the record 
that the difference in treatment was even considered by the court. Such a sentencing, 
given without regard to the mandates of the guidelines and the case law, constitutes an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion and a denial of the Appellant's constitutional rights 
under Article I, Section 24. It is appropriate for any issue of constitutional law to be first 
raised before the Appellate Court, whether or not brought up before the trial court. 
Specifically, the Appellate Court acknowledged, in State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 772 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990), that: 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have allowed 
a Rule 11 challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be considered for the first time 
on appeal. "[I]n certain cases we may consider the failure to comply with Rule 
11(5) and Gibbons as error sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised 
on appeal to this court." State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (per curiam). See also State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987). 
Although we acknowledge that the trial judge made a greater effort to 
ensure that defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly given than in Valencia 
. . . , because of the fundamental rights involved, we conclude the trial court's 
deficiencies in determining whether the guilty plea was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily constitute plain error. [Footnote omitted.] We therefore will address 
this issue for the first time on appeal. 
The State's Brief states (p. 4) that "the defendant requested the trial court 
to impose the guidelines sentence," which may have led the court to believe that it was 
"free to disregard the guidelines." The State's Brief contains no citation in the record to 
any request made by the Appellant for the court to impose the guidelines sentence, and in 
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reading the transcript of all three hearings, Appellant can find no such request. Rather, 
the judge's outburst at the beginning of the hearing of January 12, 1995, had the effect of 
placing a damper on the ability of Appellant's counsel to make any references whatsoever 
to the terms of the plea bargain and to the recommendations. He simply was precluded 
by the judge's anger from introducing any objection of any kind, and even from requiring 
the prosecutor to read the Statement of Defendant and Order, prepared by the prosecutor, 
which specifically stated (Appellant's Brief Addendum) that the prosecutor was going to 
recommend a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation before the Appellant was sentenced. Had 
the prosecutor been required to refresh his memory by reading the Statement, it is very 
likely that the sentence would have been different. However, the judge's anger toward 
both counsel precluded that possibility. The Appellant cannot be held responsible for the 
circumstances created by the trial court, which made it impossible for his counsel to make 
requests or objections he otherwise would have made. 
POINT II 
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECTOR TO RECOMMEND THE SIXTY-DAY 
EVALUATION MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
THERE WERE TRUE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT AND THAT OF JASON BLACK, HIS 
CO-DEFENDANT 
The State reminds us that the differences between the co-defendants is 
nicely" shown by Detective Sutherland's comments in both PSIs. The Appellant wishes 
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to point out that Detective Sutherland stated his belief concerning the two defendants, but 
nowhere has the State provided any showing of Detective Sutherland's qualifications to 
make such findings. The State further fails to mention that despite this difference in the 
detective's beliefs, use of the State's own guidelines provided similar conclusions as to 
the best recommendation for each youth. (It is ironic that the State points out that despite 
the detective's concerns, he recommended that this defendant receive a sentence similar 
to Black's; it seems foolish to suggest that the court should believe the Detective's 
comment, but disbelieve his sentence recommendation. The detective is either credible or 
not; the State cannot have it both ways.) 
It may well have been Detective Sutherland's concerns about the Appellant 
that let the county prosecutor to recommend a diagnostic evaluation (indeed, these 
thoughts were expressed by Defendant's counsel at the time of sentencing, [transcript of 
January 12, 1995, pp. 10-15]), making the prosecutor's onus even greater for his failure 
to keep his bargain. 
The net effect was that the law was not uniformly applied to the Appellant 
at the time of his sentencing. 
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POINT III 
THE APPELLANT HAS APPEALED THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
ACCEPTANCE OF HIS PLEA UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING 
The State has continually referred to Defendant/Appellant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, and has not addressed the Appellant's point that the trial court 
was wrong in accepting the plea, given the circumstances at the time of sentencing. 
Those circumstances were: 
One, that the prosecutor failed to acknowledge the terms of the plea bargain 
he had made, and specifically Paragraph 13 of the Statement of the Defendant, which 
contained those terms; and that when defense counsel tried to bring those terms to the 
court's attention he was stopped by the trial judge, who proceeded to castigate both 
counsel and refused to listen to the proof contained in the Statement. 
Two, the Appellant knew that he had the same recommendation from Adult 
Probation and Parole as did Co-defendant Black, knew that the prosecution concurred in 
the recommendation, knew that Co-defendant Black (two years older than he) had been 
given a suspended sentence wherein he served only 120 days in jail, was ordered to pay 
restitution, and was placed on three years probation; with the result that the Defendant 
had every expectation of receiving like treatment, and did not therefore have a "free" 
choice, without undue influence and pressure, in entering his plea. 
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The State has made another misstatement in its Note 6, appended to Point 
III, stating that "the defense attorney actually asked to expedite the sentencing hearing." 
The record shows (page 10) that it was Mr. Jeppesen, Wis prosecutor, who asked that the 
sentencing be moved up, stating that he was requesting a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation 
and that AP&P would not need further time than that to arrange for the evaluation. It 
seems obvious that the prosecutor was expecting the judge to order the ninety-day 
evaluation at the time of sentencing. However, at the time of sentencing the prosecutor 
did not make that request and the evaluation was not ordered. 
Secondly, the State has also totally disregarded herein the entitlement of the 
Appellant to the benefit of his bargain. That entitlement was treated in Appellant's Brief. 
It seems absolutely ludicrous to expect the Defendant to make a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea before any occurrence that informs him the plea is not to his benefit. The plea 
has to be a "voluntary and intelligent choice . . . entered knowingly and voluntarily." 
Salazarv. Warden. 852 P.2d 988 (Utah S. Ct.1993). 
Lastly, in State v. Smith. 777 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial judge did not 
strictly comply with Rule 11. The court ruled that the test for complying with Rule 11 is 
the strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons, and found then that neither the plea 
bargain affidavit nor the trial judge clearly communicated that defendant would be 
required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence of five years. 
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Parenthetically, Appellant requests a ruling of clarification with regard to 
this point. Since Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied by the trial 
court in an unsigned Minute Entry of January 30, 1995, and the Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed on February 17, 1995, despite the Appeals Court's dismissal of the appeal 
with regard to the withdrawal of the guilty plea on April 20, 1995, followed by the entry 
of a signed order of denial of the motion on August 14, 1995, does not Rule 4(c), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, automatically apply as of the date of August 14? (A notice 
of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision but before the entry of the judgment 
of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.) 
Appellant requests a clarification of the effect on the April dismissal on the Rule 4(c) 
application to the August 14 signed order. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAS NEVER SUGGESTED 
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS BIASED; WE BELIEVE, 
HOWEVER, THAT HIS JUDGMENT WAS MOMENTARILY 
CLOUDED BY HIS IRRITATION, ANGER, OR PIQUE, AND 
THE DECISION RENDERED THEREUNDER BECAME 
PERSONAL, RATHER THAN JUDICIAL. 
Point VI of Appellant's Brief describes the mood of the sentencing judge as 
it was reflected toward the prosecutor and defense counsel at the time of sentencing. 
Nothing further need be added here except that the Brief clearly does not accuse the judge 
of bias, but rather of emotion, causing his decision to go beyond the realm of judicial 
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discretion. No affidavit of bias is necessary under these circumstances. The transcript 
adequately sets forth the words and even the tone of the hearing. This Court has 
jurisdiction to review the trial court's personal discretion. Appellant's Brief at 16. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusions set forth in Appellant's Brief are still appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this o $ _ day of December, 1995. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Appellant 
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